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Abstract
Several provocative studies on organizational neuroscience have been published of late, 
many in the domain of leadership. These studies are motivated by the prospect of 
being able to better explain what causes and constitutes ‘good’ leadership by examining 
brain activity. In so doing, these studies follow an established path in organizational 
research that seeks to reduce complex social phenomena to more basic (neurological) 
processes. However, advocates of organizational neuroscience reveal very little about 
the fundamental problems and challenges of reductionism. Therefore, our aim in this 
article is to scrutinize the reductionist assumptions and processes underlying the fast-
evolving domain of organizational neuroscience as it is applied to the study of leadership. 
We maintain that without explicit consideration of, and solutions to, the challenges of 
reductionism, the possibilities to advance leadership studies theoretically and empirically 
are limited. In consequence, inferential ambiguities that flow from such insights run the 
danger of informing organizational practice inadequately. Thus, we find suggestions that 
we are at the brink of a neuroscientific revolution in the study of leadership premature, 
and a sole focus on neuroscience, at the expense of insights from other social science 
disciplines, dangerous.
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Introduction
In this article, we1 seek to challenge the current advocacy of organizational neuroscience, 
especially in the domain of leadership research (Balthazard et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012b; 
Senior et al., 2011; Waldman et al., 2011). We do so by scrutinizing the reductive assump-
tions and processes of organizational neuroscience as applied to the study of leadership. 
This challenge is both timely and imperative vis-a-vis largely unidentified or unresolved 
theoretical and practical issues associated with reductionism in organizational neurosci-
ence. Accordingly, we are concerned about the quality of inferences drawn from this 
research and how they inform organizational practice.
The advocacy of reductionism in organizational neuroscience is often expressed 
along the following lines. For instance, some scholars maintain that neuroscientific 
research affords a better understanding of the relationship between ‘organizational 
behavior and our brains and allows us to dissect specific social processes at the neuro-
biological level and apply a wider range of analysis to specific organizational research’ 
(Senior et al., 2011: 804). By the same token, Becker et al. (2011: 934, emphasis added) 
suggest that neuroscience can ‘elucidate particular networks of brain systems and pro-
cesses responsible for the workplace attitudes and behaviors that organizational schol-
ars have observed. Neuroscience can allow us to finally go inside the brain and 
investigate these primal causes of behavior’. In all this excitement, some leadership 
scholars even go as far as to ponder whether, by using neuroscience, we can ‘revolution-
ize the way that inspirational leaders are identified and developed?’ (Waldman et al., 
2011: 60). Therefore, neuroscientific approaches follow the well-trodden path in man-
agement research that yield the identification and analysis of more basic mechanisms 
that are assumed to give rise to higher order organizational phenomena (Felin et al., in 
press; Nicholson and White, 2006).
In support of reductionism, Becker et al. (2011: 936, emphasis added) claim that ‘hier-
archical reductionism is a proper goal of science, since an explanation at one level of 
abstraction will inevitably lead to questions that are better answered at other levels’.2 
Becker et al. (2011) invoke Pinker’s account of hierarchical reductionism, which ‘consists 
not of replacing one field of knowledge with another but of connecting or unifying them’ 
(Pinker, 2002: 70, emphasis in original). Becker et al. (2011) also highlight a number of 
potential concerns about such reductive approaches. For instance, they acknowledge the 
possibility that the pursuit of molecular explanations potentially supplants other forms of 
social science inquiry, especially when scholars focus upon ‘mechanisms within mecha-
nisms within mechanisms’ (Franklin, 1987: 202). Yet, for Becker et al. (2011), such con-
cerns seem to fall short of comprehending the ultimate benefits and advances associated 
with the explanatory power of such lower-level phenomena. These insights are seemingly 
possible because neuroscience reduces organizational phenomena to what is considered to 
be a common denominator i.e. neural processes, which are mostly homogenous across all 
individuals – and these are suggested to underlie a wide range of varying situations at 
work (Becker et al., 2011). More specifically, organizational neuroscience is proposed to 
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be able to reduce what some scholars see as variously layered, recursive and theoretically 
complex interactions between leaders and followers (Cunliffe, 2009; Cunliffe and Eriksen, 
2011) to a set of linear, sequential patterns of limited variety, such as the dichotomous 
outputs (i.e. firing/dormant) of neurons. Through this reduction in complexity, otherwise 
difficult to study social affairs can be readily subjected to scientific analysis.
Therefore, the neuroscientific approach to management research can be understood in 
terms of a two-fold movement that first ‘deconstructs individuals to discrete brain pro-
cesses’ (Becker et al., 2011: 936), effectively erasing extant units of analysis, such as 
culture, organizations or individuals from the explanatory vocabulary, while providing 
scientists with brain patterns that can be analysed through neuroscientific methods. By 
subsequently reconstructing brain-level phenomena into higher-level explanations, this 
type of neuroscientific analysis, but also neuroscientific interventions (e.g. Waldman 
et al., 2011), are thought to extend existing leadership theories, encourage new research 
directions and resolve existing conceptual disagreements (Becker et al., 2011).
However, there are also long-standing reservations against the reductionist spirit in the 
social sciences, and a number of serious concerns have been raised against the efficacy, appli-
cability, as well as the implications of such approaches (see Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Nagel, 
1974, 1998). When we extend these concerns to the field of organizational neuroscience, we 
are urged to question the putative possibilities and benefits of reductionism in the neuroscien-
tific study of leadership. We elaborate upon these reservations in the course of our article.
The following three aspects bear great importance in our critique. First, our position 
closely aligns with that of Hobfoll (2001), who maintains that:
the moment we are seduced into thinking that any one level of analysis is the primary active 
agent, we forestall the scientific process and acquire scientific tendencies to guard the borders 
of our theories against the veracity of broader perspectives. (Hobfoll, 2001: 339) 
Applied to our scrutinizing analysis, we argue that a predominant focus upon neuro-
science to the study of leadership as an individual difference (see Waldman et al., 2011) 
excludes further important units of analysis, as well as relational and recursive aspects of 
organizational life (Cunliffe, 2009; Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011). Consequently, we main-
tain that an unbridled pursuit of organizational neuroscience is more likely to impoverish 
rather than enrich our substantive understanding of leadership.
Second, and related to the first point, we argue that a more appropriate ontological locus 
of leadership resides in the dyadic relationship between a leader and follower – as opposed 
to a leader-centric (Antonakis et al., 2011) or follower-centric locus (Meindl, 1995). 
Specifically, we concur that existing research on dyadic relationships at work (i.e. between 
a leader and follower) often reflects a misalignment between theory and measurement 
(Krasikova and LeBreton, 2012). That is, even though a construct is theorized as dyadic, 
scholars often obtain data from one source only (e.g. follower perceptions of trust), while 
not being sufficiently sensitive to contextual nuances (see Lindebaum and Fielden, 2011). 
Our appreciation of the dyadic nature of leadership, coupled with the need to be contextu-
ally sensitive, is incongruent with the predominant view of organizational neuroscientists 
who view leadership largely as residing in the leader (e.g. Waldman et al., 2011).
Third, our challenge draws upon the philosophy of science (e.g. Nagel, 1998) and 
experimental psychology literature (e.g. Zajonc, 1984) as a bedrock for our scrutiny. 
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Reductionism is a key subject in the philosophy of science. The notion of reductionism 
entails that there exists, in principle, a ‘theory of everything’ (Nagel, 1998) and scholars 
have developed numerous accounts and frameworks of reductionism (e.g. Feyerabend, 
1962; Nagel, 1961). One comprehensive classification of different types of reductions is 
provided by Sarkar (1992), who distinguishes between: (i) theoretical, (ii) constitutive 
(or ontological) and (iii) explanatory reductions. We base our subsequent analysis upon 
this classification in order to highlight key assumptions in each category – and how they 
inform challenges and implications of neuroscientific leadership research. We conclude 
our analysis by synthesizing the theoretical implications and foreshadow their impact 
upon organizational practice.
Theory reduction
Background
A key aspect of organizational neuroscience is the reducibility of higher-order, social 
theories to what are considered to be more fundamental theories of brain processes 
(Becker et al., 2011; Waldman et al., 2011). However, in one of the earliest comprehen-
sive analyses of reductive processes, Ernst Nagel (1961) recognizes that the connectabil-
ity of different theoretical layers is not necessarily straightforward. Theory reduction 
implies ‘the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established in one area 
of inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably formulated for some other domain’ 
(Nagel, 1961: 338). The connectability of two areas depends upon the fit between the 
different ‘systems of statements’, as well as the formalized laws in both domains (see 
also Kaiser, 2012). Depending upon such a fit, Nagel (1961) distinguishes homogenous 
or heterogeneous forms of reduction.
In homogeneous reductions, the reduced theory and its ‘absorbing’, lower-level the-
ory utilize substantially the same terms, and hence terminologies on both levels correlate 
with each other. In heterogeneous reductions, on the other hand, the reduced theory can-
not be derived logically from the laws of the reducing theory. For instance, the reduction 
of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics involves heterogeneous terminologies (e.g. 
‘temperature’ and ‘statistical distribution’, respectively; see Fazekas, 2009: 305). To con-
nect the different layers, heterogeneous reductions require additional ‘bridging laws’ that 
correlate the terminologies of both domains (Nagel, 1961: 354). This means that one 
would need to articulate such a law to ‘bridge’ the notion of temperature − understood as 
movement between molecules (which is a non-statistical function) − with average values 
of statistical mechanics. There are substantial difficulties in establishing clear and une-
quivocal bridges − a fact highlighted by the ongoing discussions about the possibility of 
such derivations (Fazekas, 2009).
Relevance to neuroscientific study of leadership
We can explicate the problems of bridge laws by referring to Becker et al.’s (2011) 
account of mirror neurons, and how their analysis can potentially expand organizational 
theories. Mirror neurons denote a complex and largely unconscious brain process, which 
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continuously monitors the behaviours and affective states of other individuals. This is 
suggested to afford the generation of ‘automatic and nonconscious social ties between 
individuals’ (Becker et al., 2011: 939). Mirror neurons are, therefore, argued to explain 
the contagion of emotions in groups and the affective partaking of individuals in emo-
tional states of others, whether they are aware of it or not. For instance, in the context of 
workplace discrimination, the behaviour of mirror neurons is suggested to represent the 
‘deeper causes’ of such behaviour, residing in the ‘deep-brain structures of the limbic 
system’ (Becker et al., 2011: 941). In their appended primer on neuroscience, Becker 
et al. depict this limbic system graphically as part of the temporal lobe and describe its 
functioning in terms of dichotomous outputs of neurons (dormant/fire; see Becker et al., 
2011: 953−954), once certain thresholds have been reached.
But how do mirror neurons explain the workings of implicit assumptions and attitudes 
held by leaders in organizational contexts? To investigate this question, we have to 
understand how we can get from acts of ‘discrimination’ observed in leaders’ uncon-
scious, or tacit behaviours to the activity of neurons in particular parts of the brain. 
Applying Nagel’s (1961) criteria, it is apparent that the theoretical connections between 
neuroscientific processes and leadership phenomena are heterogeneous in two important 
ways. First, there are different semantic and context-theoretical conceptions. For instance, 
even though both domains refer to ‘tacit’ aspects, the meaning attached to this concept 
differs strongly. Becker et al. invoke the neuro-biomedical idiom of brain topologies – 
typically particular areas visible in brain scans. By contrast, relational leadership schol-
ars invoke vocabularies that differ significantly from those of neuroscientists, for 
instance, when they associate tacitness with ‘knowing-from-within interactive moments’ 
(Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011: 1433, emphasis in original), or with understanding of 
momentary subtleties to develop new approaches to ‘acting, looking, listing, talking, 
evaluating’ (Shotter, 2010: 160). Second, there are different kinds of logic in the concep-
tualization of the relationships involved. Neuroscientific analyses operate largely on the 
basis of binary logics, indicating active (firing) or passive (dormant) states of neurons. 
The explanatory construct is animated through linear and sequentially unfolding pro-
cesses, for instance, when environmental stimuli trigger neurons to fire and thereby, 
subsequently, cause or influence human behaviour (see also Becker et al., 2011: 952). 
Leadership scholars across a range of ontological traditions, on the other hand, eschew 
binary logics when characterizing the relational and reciprocal character of leader and 
follower exchanges. For instance, discourse scholars show that high quality 
leader−member exchanges come into genesis ‘dialogically’ (Fairhurst, 2009: 1611), 
including role negotiations, and non-routine problem solving. Unlike linear and uni-
dimensional processes, leaders are involved in contexts that are multi-layered, trans-
forming dynamically with every action a leader and follower does − or does not take. 
Similarly, Cunliffe (2009: 95) investigates reflexive accounts of leadership as ‘selves-in 
relation-to-others’. Elsewhere, she adds that leadership is ‘embedded in the everyday 
relationally-responsive dialogical practice of leaders’ (Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011: 1425). 
In these accounts, leadership entails past experiences and future expectations that can 
shift with every relational interaction. Even psychologists have bemoaned of late that, 
albeit many phenomena of interest to applied psychological studies have a dyadic core 
(e.g. leader−member exchange), the relational side of these dyadic constructs is 
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oftentimes not adequately examined empirically (Krasikova and LeBreton, 2012). 
Consequently, a misalignment between theory and measurement occurs if leader−member 
exchanges are theorized as relational but data are only collected from the follower (e.g. 
perception of trust toward the leader).
Returning to Nagel’s (1961) bridge laws, we argue that there is a lack of ‘fit’ between 
the terminologies and logics of organizational and neuroscientific theories. We, there-
fore, require additional qualifications to connect the otherwise disparate domains and to 
provide ‘co-reference’ for the different theories and their heterogeneous vocabularies 
and logics. This means that links from higher-level descriptors to lower-level explana-
tions (e.g. from the perception of an angry face to patterns of brain activation; see Lee 
et al., 2012a), or from the execution of controlled cognitive processes to the activities in 
the prefrontal cortex (Becker et al., 2011), have to be made explicit and qualified in a 
way that ensures that the terminological and structural logic of leadership research is 
coherently and comprehensively represented (i.e. ‘bridged’) at the neuroscientific level. 
Such qualifiers must, therefore, include statements that unequivocally relate the recipro-
cal logic and complex terminology of leader−follower interactions to patterns of dor-
mant/firing states of neurons.
However, this bridging law condition is not trivial. Formulating statements that uni-
versally and unambiguously link, for instance, particular locations in the brain with 
socio-relational concepts, opens up a variety of further ambiguities. For instance, even a 
simply constructed ‘bridge law’ of the form ‘neural activity in the temporal lobe (mirror 
neurons) indicates increased discrimination in leaders’ decision making’ requires further 
definitions and clarifications to explain their workings. For example, it would be nonsen-
sical to suggest that a 50 per cent rise in neural activity means a 50 per cent rise in exer-
cised ‘discrimination’ by leaders. Whereas the first measure is one of quantity, we would 
struggle to express the various and changing facets of discrimination in a workplace in 
terms of one linear, numerical scale. This bridge law would thus require a set of further 
clarifications.
The complexity and required depth of these additional statements could, therefore, 
considerably lessen the degree of simplicity for which the reduction was initially 
intended, resulting, at best, in complex sets of correlative qualifications, and, at worst, in 
an infinite regression of qualifiers (Schouten and de Jong, 2007). The question, there-
fore, remains whether and how social phenomena, such as ‘leadership’ or ‘power’, can 
be translated into a language and logic of neuroscience consisting of neurons that cannot 
‘lead’ or be ‘powerful’, because the attachment of social predicates to a set of chemical 
reactions is nonsensical.
For these reasons we suggest that it is impossible to logically and consistently corre-
late what is measured on a neuroscientific level with the relational and socially complex 
phenomenon of leadership. Moreover, we argue that the impossibility of bridging the 
leadership/neuroscience schism is not merely a matter of degree and, in consequence, an 
issue that can be resolved once technological advances afford computation of greater 
complexity. Instead, we suggest that there are different ‘logical types’ at play (Bateson, 
1972: 180) − that is, differences in kind whose conflation or even correlation poses insur-
mountable problems. If this holds true, it may mean that attempted reductions are bound 
to fail, thus calling into question the quality of inferences drawn.
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Constitutive reductions
Background
A second form of reduction is based on the assumption of ontological links, where lower-
level phenomena are assumed to be ‘constitutive’ of higher-level ones (Sarkar, 1992). In 
addition to advances in theory, organizational neuroscience approaches frequently refer 
to the neurological constitution of human life. For instance, Becker et al. (2011: 934, 
emphasis added) suggest that:
Our ultimate aim is to establish an organizational neuroscience perspective that strives to 
understand and incorporate the cognitive machinery behind our thoughts and actions into 
organizational theory … Leveraging this knowledge will reduce our level of analysis to the 
most basic building blocks of behavior.3
This suggests that there is an ontological link between higher and lower levels of 
analyses so that, for instance, entities at a higher (individual/social) level cannot alter 
without also altering entities at the lower (brain) level. This so-called ‘supervenience’ 
(e.g. Davidson, 1970) is, therefore, more radical than theory reduction, suggesting a 
monism which holds that, in Thomas Nagel’s (1998: 3) words, ‘everything is made of the 
same elements’ (see also Dennett, 1996).
However, there is much scepticism about the ontological commitment to such basic 
elements. Thomas Nagel (1974), for instance, suggests that there is a general difficulty 
about psycho-physical reductions, because experience does not fit the pattern of other 
scientific reductions. It does not surprise that the problem of consciousness is a recurring 
anti-reductionist theme (Nagel, 1998; Tallis, 2011). Some have, therefore, highlighted 
the difficulties of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical 
(Kim, 1998), whereas others have suggested that living organisms possess ‘something 
else’ than biochemical processes − a ‘vital’ element that has no material manifestation 
(Bergson, 1988). Such processes would be of a different logical kind, and necessarily 
remain invisible to neuroscientific analysis.
Relevance to neuroscientific study of leadership
Our previous points suggest that the reductionist aim of achieving greater clarity and 
objectivity so as to arrive at a more accurate view of the real nature of leadership, for 
instance, by studying a leader’s ‘real’, neurologically visible state of ‘discrimination’, is 
not necessarily achievable. What these studies fail to grasp is ‘what it is like to be’ that 
particular leader. Thomas Nagel argues that the subjective character of such experience 
cannot be configured in terms of an objective and singular viewpoint, as this would miss 
richness and detail which do ‘not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in human 
language’ (Nagel, 1974: 442). Specifically, Nagel contends that consciousness cannot be 
analysed by means of any explanatory systems of functional or intentional states, for 
these could be attributed to ‘robots . . . that behaved like people though they experience 
nothing’ (p. 436, emphasis added). But Nagel does not stop here, and delves deeper into 
the matter of subjective experiences and how these actively resist reduction to physical 
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states or conditions. He maintains that, if facts about experiences, or facts that concern 
what it is like for the experiencing individual (e.g. a leader) are ‘accessible only from one 
point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experience could be revealed 
in the physical operation of that organism [i.e. a leader]’ (Nagel, 1974: 438). In this 
respect, Tallis (2010) reminds us that if we assume the brain to be a collection of pieces 
of matter, then this arrangement cannot explain experiences unless, of course, the pic-
tures and graphs produced in neuroscientific analyses are interpreted to represent some-
thing about workplace discrimination. This, however, re-introduces observation and 
description or, in short, ‘consciousness’.
It may further raise our suspicion that advocates of organizational neuroscience 
devote so much effort to the task of demonstrating the supposed triviality of the idea of 
consciousness. Becker et al. (2011: 948), for instance, refer to the ‘binding problem’, 
which concerns ‘the conscious sense that our perceptions, thoughts, decisions, and 
actions result from a unitary and contemplative process, even though the underlying 
neural mechanisms may often be anything but unified and are frequently nonconscious’. 
For Becker et al., the inaccessibility of consciousness in neuroscientific approaches is 
not a problem, but a benefit. Because neuroscience is suggested to have direct access to 
the unfiltered, unordered and dispersed mechanisms that underlie the more ordered inter-
pretations that the conscious mind makes, it erases the individual from the explanatory 
process, cleansing research from errors and ambiguities that lurk in respondents’ 
self-reports.
Yet, two problems undermine this idea. First, whereas neuroscience indeed investi-
gates biochemical processes that directly reflect mental activity prior to conscious inter-
pretation, conscious human interpretation is still at play. The results and inferences 
drawn by organizational neuroscientists are the processes of their ‘unitary and contem-
plative processes’. This effectively means that, whereas conscious processes of the 
research subjects are deemed distorting and replaced by scientific measurement, the 
thought processes of researchers are implied to be immune from such distortion. Second, 
philosophers of science have articulated profound objections to the neglect of conscious-
ness. For instance, Nagel (1974) posits that conscious mental states (or the subjective 
experience) of an individual are not captured by any reductive processes, adding that 
these processes are plausibly compatible with the nonexistence of subjective experi-
ences. This is because we lack a detailed explanation of the physical nature of a mental 
phenomenon (Nagel, 1974). From the neuroscientific ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel, 
1974), it is, therefore, impossible to understand what it is like to be a leader. Such an 
experience, Tallis (2010) adds, cannot be explained by the brain’s response to stimuli 
alone, as it always entails multiple levels of awareness which are simultaneously at play.
Another line of argument against the consideration of consciousness is put forth by 
Lee et al. For them, consciousness and, therefore, the idea that, in the most fundamental 
sense, we must be more than our brains and bodies, is indicative of a ‘rather self-centered 
view of the universe, despite its inherent attractiveness and appeal to our actual lived 
experiences’ (Lee et al., 2012b: 213). However, we can also reverse this point and won-
der whether the neuroscientific assumption that all complex processes of our environ-
ment are reducible to what goes on in our brains indicates not an equally self-centred 
view of the universe. This view entails the suggestion that there can be nothing outside 
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the computational powers of our brains, not even consciousness or reflection, unless 
manifest in neuroscientific measurements. Moreover, this leaves us in the uncomfortable 
position where we have to wonder what consideration we should give to scholarly argu-
ments that seemingly are made without any conscious thought as the products of bundles 
of biochemical reactions alone.
What is in our head is consequently not indicative of what is ‘out there’. It is at best a 
‘re-presentation’ which, as Tallis (2011) observes, requires a world of phenomena, from 
which such re-presentations can be gained. Weick et al. (2005) emphasize the importance 
of understanding the difference between our mental re-presentations and the processes 
from which they are abstracted. Failing to distinguish both leads to the generation of 
paradoxes, ambiguities and contradictions which we frequently encounter in manage-
ment research (Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001). It is important to highlight that this is not 
merely a problem of language, but also of human emotions, abstract concepts and mental 
activity. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 177) insist, ‘though most of these can be experi-
enced directly, none of them can be fully comprehended on their own terms’, so that it is 
necessary to transfer understandings from other domains. For instance, leaders may 
understand an organization in terms of (the metaphor of) a machine, and find themselves 
uncomfortable if their experience does not match their expectations of mechanistic pro-
cesses. Measuring their emotional states may thus reveal merely the difference between 
how they expect the world to be (i.e. transferred understandings) and the complexities of 
organizational life − which continually evade full comprehension and measurement. 
Acknowledging these wider complexities is, therefore, not taking recourse to an esoteric 
notion of human consciousness as organizational neuroscientists might object, but a rec-
ognition that the full and multi-textured nature of organizational processes cannot be 
captured by analysing the brain processes of an individual.
The empirical limitations of constitutive reductionism become evident when consid-
ering contributions from scholars interested in multi-level phenomena and leadership. 
For instance, Fisher and To (2012: 867) maintain that data obtained at the between-
individuals level ‘cannot be generalized automatically to relationships among apparently 
similar variables’ at the ‘within-individual’ level or vice versa. They also argue that ‘the 
underlying processes and the strength and direction of relationships can be quite differ-
ent at different levels and must be investigated at each level’ (p. 867). In terms of the 
latter, leadership scholars have long argued that what holds at one level of analysis (e.g. 
the individual) may not hold at another (e.g. collectives of individuals; see Yammarino 
and Dubinsky, 1994). Take the theory of transformational leader, for example. Burns 
(1978: 4) characterizes the transformational leader as someone who ‘looks for potential 
motives in followers, seeks to satisfy higher needs, and engages the full person of the 
follower’. He goes on to suggest that the result ‘is a relationship of mutual stimulation 
and elevation that converts followers into leaders’ (p. 4). Proponents have consistently 
claimed that transformational leadership holds at the individual, group, and organiza-
tional level of analysis (Bass, 1985, 1998; Conger and Kanungo, 1998). And yet, there is 
empirical evidence that disconfirms this claim. Foremost here are studies by Yammarino 
and colleagues (Avolio et al., 1991; Avolio and Yammarino, 1990). In one study, they 
have confirmed that follower perceptions of transformational leadership outcomes (i.e. 
subordinate extra efforts, subordinate performance and effectiveness of superior) are based 
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upon individual differences that exist independently of group membership in the context 
of sales (Yammarino and Dubinsky, 1994). In other words, the data show that transfor-
mational leadership lies in the perceptions of individual followers, and not in the percep-
tions of dyads or groups. The finding that transformational leadership resides in the 
perceptions of the beholder is further supported in a recent multi-rater transformational 
leadership study. The transformational leadership ratings of two team members relative 
to their project manager neither correlated with each other nor with ratings provided by 
the project managers’ line manager. In fact, correlations were randomly negative or posi-
tive, and nearing a practical significance of zero (Lindebaum and Cartwright, 2010). In 
other words, agreement in team-level perception does not manifest itself in that study, 
and neither does agreement among individual raters. For the premises of ontological 
reductionism to hold, however, one would expect that ratings at the individual and team 
level would show greater convergence, which they do not.
Together, these philosophical, theoretical and empirical considerations show that onto-
logical claims associated with constitutive reductionism are inherently problematic for the 
study of leadership, for they show that there is a discontinuity of effects from one level of 
analysis to another. Higher-order phenomena are not merely the products of lower-level 
processes, and attempts to reduce dyadic, group or organizational level aspects to indi-
viduals’ brain activities run into the danger of producing grossly distorted ideas about how 
the world ‘up there’ really is, thereby affecting the quality of inferences drawn.
Explanatory reductions
Background
In addition to theory and constitutive reductionism, Sarkar (1992) suggests that a third 
form of reductionism makes explanatory claims, without necessarily clinging to the 
ontological commitments associated with constitutive reductions. Explanatory reduc-
tionism refers to models of reduction that imply relations of explanations, such that the 
reduced entity is explained by the reducing entity, irrespective of whether this entity is a 
theory, law or observation (Sarkar, 1992). Explanatory reductionism can be understood 
in terms of the wider ideal that different sciences study the same basic processes in vary-
ing degrees of aggregation, reflecting the positivist ideal of the whole of science as one 
coherent project (Nagel, 1998). Already, more than 50 years ago, Oppenheim and Putnam 
(1958) offered a succinct description of this ideal:
It is not absurd to suppose that psychological laws may eventually be explained in terms of the 
behavior of individual neurons in the brain; that the behavior of individual cells—including 
neurons—may eventually be explained in terms of their biochemical constitution; and that the 
behavior of molecules—including the macro-molecules that make up living cells—may eventually 
be explained in terms of atomic physics. If this is achieved, then psychological laws will have, in 
principle, been reduced to laws of atomic physics. (Oppenheim and Putnam, 1958: 7)
This ideal reverberates through the extant organizational neuroscience debate, and it is not 
difficult to speculate about reasons for its swift uptake. By taking the socially complex 
and reciprocal nature of leadership into the body, it is argued that social scientists are 
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finally able to emulate the natural science by producing hard, reliable and objective data 
(see Blackburn, 2011; Duster, 2006). In light of this ideal, we can understand the appeal 
of the neuroscientific project, for instance, when Becker et al. (2011: 936) proclaim reduc-
tionism to be the ‘ultimate goal of science’.
In this goal, we find a form of explanatory reduction aimed at establishing relations 
between rules, mechanism or fragments (Sarkar, 1992). Applied to inter-level reductions 
and explanations, Sarkar (1992: 176) argues that reductive explanation is the ‘explana-
tion of a whole in terms of its parts’. In the context of leadership, this implies the expla-
nation of leadership (i.e. a social phenomenon) by way of studying brain processes 
depicting analogous patterns. Whereas Sarkar (1992) argues that scientific explanation 
tends to represent a quest for statistically pertinent factors, others go further and claim 
that explanations can be understood as a quest for causal factors as opposed to statisti-
cally pertinent ones (Wimsatt, 1976; see also Von Wright, 1971). This quest for causality 
oftentimes shines through in the arguments of advocates of organizational neuroscience 
(e.g. Becker et al., 2011; but see also below for more details).
Yet, when it comes to explanatory reductions, serious challenges emerge. First, in 
what is termed the ‘multiple realizations’ problem, scholars question the reducibility of 
psychological states to brain processes. Second, there is what we call the ‘body−brain 
pattern’, which suggests that the brain may not be the unequivocal site from which 
human behaviours emerge, even though signals arising from the body are integrated in 
higher brain regions to regulate decisions (Damasio, 2000). We discuss both in turn, and 
incorporate, where applicable, examples from leadership studies to remain consistent 
with preceding sections.
Multiple realizations
In a series of papers in the 1960s, Hilary Putnam outlined the ‘multiple realizations’ 
problem, questioning the viability of reductive explanations. This problem concerns the 
idea that psychological states are reducible to ‘brain states’ and has since been repeatedly 
reiterated and developed (Gillett, 2003; Schouten and de Jong, 2007; Shapiro, 2000). At 
its core lies the suggestion that one and the same psychological state can be realized 
multiply by different and distinct neural processes (Bickle, 2010). Putnam (1979: 292) 
argues that: ‘two systems can have quite different constitutions and be functionally iso-
morphic. For example, a computer made of electrical components can be isomorphic to 
one made of cogs and wheels’. Here, the problem is that, whereas the make-up of an 
electronic or manual computer system varies drastically, its effect – what it produces – is 
the same. Putnam’s point is, therefore, that any psychological event-type can be realized 
physically in very diverse ways depending on the organism involved. This makes it 
almost impossible to identify any single type of neural or physical state (Kim, 1989). 
Applied to the neuroscientific context, this problem suggests that ‘one and the same 
psychological kind is multiply realized by distinct physical-chemical (e.g. neural) kinds’, 
which urges us to conclude that the idea that cognitive phenomena are ‘brain-states’ is 
problematic (Bickle, 2010: 247, emphasis in original). On the whole, the multiple reali-
zations problem corresponds to well-worn ideas in organizational behaviour research 
referred to as equifinality (Martin and Fellenz, 2010).
868 Human Relations 66(6)
Moreover, in addition to the problems posed by multiple realizations of higher-level phe-
nomena, we suggest that we can also reverse Putnam’s original arguments to gain further, 
potentially problematic insights. Rather than only suggesting that different neurological 
states can lead to the same psychological state, we argue that, even if it was possible to 
locate particular biochemical processes or brain sections, they would be likely to lead to dif-
ferent higher-level effects, especially when considered from a relational perspective. For 
example, whether the meaning of a leader’s behaviour or expression is taken literally, or if it 
is understood ironically, or as a joke, depends upon social reception, context and situation. 
For instance, a declaration of intent by a leader may in some situations be taken as invigorat-
ing, but in others as merely ridiculous. Here, the arbiter for what is realized depends not only 
upon what is said and done – and, therefore, on intended and unintended brain functions of 
the individual − but upon how these actions are realized qualitatively in a social context.
Nagel (1998) illustrates this with the example of how an old-fashioned typewriter 
produces a capital letter. Analysis of the mechanics involved, the construction and move-
ment of the button and lever raising the carriage so that the capital letter hits the roll, 
remains necessarily mute about what such a letter does, say, in the structure of a sentence 
or in the flow of written conversation. Similarly, the study of a leader’s anticipation of 
their influence, and their respective brain patterns, cannot shed light on the social effects 
of their statements. The same processes on the neurological level may thus lead to vastly 
different ‘multiple’ realizations at the higher level. This is a problem probably all of us 
have experienced when telling a joke which some members of the audience have heard 
before but for others it is the first time. Prone to this kind of multiple realization problem 
are, in particular, ‘conventional’ properties, which gain meaning only in relation to other 
constituents and, therefore, emerge only on higher levels without being reducible to 
more basic ones. For instance, conventions of language and money, but also conventions 
of morality, jokes or irony, are inexplicable on the basis of their physical attributes, gram-
matical structures, or in terms of the behaviours of individuals alone (Nagel, 1998).
Fundamental explanations cannot, therefore, be neatly applied to complex systems on 
higher levels and account for the workings of these levels satisfactorily. Qualitative dif-
ferences exist on each level of abstraction where ‘entirely new laws, concepts, and gen-
eralizations are necessary, requiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as 
in the previous one’ (Anderson, 1972: 393). But there are also problems of quantity. 
Explanatory reductions are likely to become unwieldy, for they run against the twin dif-
ficulties of scale and complexity. These accrue, for instance, if we try to communicate 
weather forecasts primarily in terms of the behaviours of individual molecules, or ana-
lyse the very real problems of the rest of science through elementary particle physics. 
Here, any possible benefit of the reduction is absorbed by the increase in complexity and 
unwieldiness of the resulting explanation. Such attempts are, therefore, quite impracti-
cal, as we would struggle computing the information to attain any meaningful insights 
(Anderson, 1972; Nagel, 1998).
Body−brain pattern
A second problem stems from the assumed directionality of causal relations. Much of the 
advocacy of using neuroscience when studying organizational problems converges on a 
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‘bottom-up’ approach (i.e. from the brain up to the social sphere) in explaining human 
behaviour. Here, the brain is isolated as the ‘primal cause of behaviour’ (Becker et al., 
2011: 934) − the ultimate referent from which most (if not all) impulses emanate, and in 
which all primary behavioural triggers occur (Boyatzis, 2011; Senior et al., 2011). 
Further examples exist in the leadership literature. For instance, although Balthazard 
et al. (2012: 244, emphasis added) discuss the ‘potential [neurological] correlates of 
transformational leadership behavior’, they also refer to the ‘neurological mechanisms 
that may underpin the transformational leadership qualities of individuals’. Similarly, 
Boyatzis (2011) claims that ‘if you believe that leadership involves inspiring others and 
motivating them to be their best and develop, learn, adapt and innovate, then activating 
the parts of their brain that will help requires arousing what we have called the Positive 
Emotional Attractor’ (no page number available, emphasis added). It is important to 
acknowledge that there are some cautionary remarks about the existing technological 
and methodological problems to the exploitation of the explanatory power of neurosci-
ence (Lee et al., 2012a). However, some scholars go as far as to propose that we can use, 
inter alia, ‘neuroscience … to reverse engineer the ingredients of good leadership’ (King 
et al., 2009: 915, emphasis added). Conceived in this way, brain processes are suggested 
not only to explain higher-order phenomena, but also to precede them, and thus seem-
ingly qualify as a cause for human behaviour. However, serious concerns exist about 
such an explanatory logic and, in particular, about the taken-for-granted directionality of 
causality from brain to body.
These problems become apparent when considering the logic of causality. Here, we 
turn to the work of Antonakis et al. (2010), who detail three pre-conditions of causality. 
For two events (x and y) to be related causally: (i) x must temporally precede y; (ii) x 
must be reliably correlated with y (beyond chance); and (iii) the relationship between 
x and y must not be accounted for by other causes. Applying this framework to the 
neuroscientific investigations at the brain level as a means of drawing causal infer-
ences for human behaviour, we can identify a number of problems. The first pre- 
condition relates to the assumed directionality of the body−brain pattern, whereas the 
second and third indicate difficulties when reducing the complex and interrelated bod-
ily patterns to clearly identifiable locations.
With regard to the first condition, the experimental branch of psychology proffers 
compelling evidence for the existence of a bottom-up mechanism (i.e. from the body to 
the brain), indicating that causality may very well run in the reverse direction. Zajonc 
(1980, 1984), for instance, argues against the prevailing view that a cognitive appraisal 
(as it occurs in the brain) always precedes an emotion. He posits that affect is often 
encoded in ‘visceral or muscular symbols’ without having direct verbal referents 
(Zajonc, 1980: 158). This is demonstrated by various electromyographic studies that 
strongly demonstrate the involvement of muscular activity ‘in the imagination, recall, 
and production of emotional states’ (Zajonc, 1980: 158). For Zajonc, this is evidence 
that affective processing is more proximal to the acquisition and retention of motor 
skills than to lists of words. In other words, muscular activities can also send signals 
‘upwards’ to the brain, which, in turn, can cause and influence emotional states. A num-
ber of recent studies in experimental psychology have further underpinned Zajonc’s 
arguments. For instance, researchers have shown that past personal life events can be 
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more easily accessed when the body is in the same position as it was in the original 
experience (Dijkstra et al., 2007; Riskind, 1983). Similarly, Casasanto and Dijkstra 
(2010) have shown that negative or positive life experiences are implicitly linked to 
schematic representations of downward and upward bodily movements, so that the 
seemingly meaningless action of moving marbles upwards ‘can cause people to think 
more positive thoughts’ (p. 179). Like Zajonc’s (1984) contention that finding evidence 
in only one situation on the primacy of affect over cognition would confirm the inde-
pendence hypothesis, so does a singular occurrence of the body−brain pattern falsify the 
hypothesis that only activities in the brain cause human behaviour. This suggests that 
brain activity does not exclusively cause human behaviour, but that it is at least partly 
the product of bodily processes, so that the brain is merely one factor in the more intri-
cately interrelated pathways of communication that, together, account for human 
behaviour.
Moreover, there are concerns about the second criteria for causal inferences (i.e. that 
x must be reliably and beyond chance correlated with y), as correlations between brain 
processes and psychological phenomena and human behaviour remain elusive. Such 
problems are partly recognized in recent organizational neuroscience debates. For 
instance, Lee et al. (2012a) suggest that the:
. . . colorful imagery that is often presented with the findings of brain imaging studies merely 
indicates the level of confidence that we have with regards to whether the particular region of 
the brain is somehow implicated in the task. Simply put, with the data available in such cases, 
it is impossible to infer a lack of involvement in a region which is not shown as activated. (Lee 
et al., 2012a: 925, emphasis added)
As a resolution, Lee et al. (2012a) invoke the ‘pure insertion hypothesis’, which posits 
that the engendered activity specific to one particular task does not change when other 
tasks are added. To demonstrate that a particular brain region is causally linked with a 
particular task, the ‘pure insertion hypothesis’ must be satisfied. This, they admit, may be 
difficult to achieve (Lee et al., 2012a), and the limitations of functional brain imaging are 
further explicated by Wastell and White (2012).
In light of the difficulty in disentangling how activation (or lack thereof) in one or 
more brain region is associated with particular tasks, Vul et al. (2009) have pondered 
whether this ignores a fundamental assumption of parametric testing (i.e. independence 
of observations). Specifically, disentangling whether activation in one or more brain 
regions is associated reliably with particular tasks is rendered problematic by the failure 
of researchers to define the brain regions under scrutiny independently of the experimen-
tal manipulation. Given that many brain regions are measured in a scan, there are (in 
effect) multiple dependent variables; by chance alone a subset of these regions may show 
an effect of the manipulation (this, we note, represents an empirical extension of the 
multiple realization problem). The tendency of some brain researchers to base their sta-
tistical analysis on particular subsets of the brain entails that the strength of the correla-
tion will be considerably inflated. Vul et al. (2009) show how this ‘non-independence 
error’ can produce statistically significant correlations from simulated brain activity 
which is pure noise.
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Antonakis et al.’s (2010) final condition posits that correlations between x and y must 
not be accounted for by other causes. That is, activity in one brain region does not only 
cause a specific behaviour to occur, but there is a confounding variable that influences 
that behaviour as well. For instance, studies on the experience of emotions suggest that, 
even if the experience of emotion may be reduced causally to brain activity, emotions are 
not entirely synonymous with specific features such as neural circuitry, synaptic changes 
or biochemical properties (Feldman Barrett et al., 2007). It is for this reason that ‘content 
cannot be entirely reduced to its causes’ because any ‘conscious event has both neurobio-
logical and phenomenological features’ (Feldman Barrett et al., 2007: 376, emphasis 
added). It is these phenomenological influences (i.e. lived experiences), we argue, that 
pose a threat to this pre-condition of causal inferences.
Our consideration on the three preconditions for causality hold important implications 
for the explanatory power of neuroscientific approaches in management. In particular, 
they suggest that the brain may not be the only site to which human behaviour can legiti-
mately be reduced. Although the brain unquestionably plays an important role (Becker 
and Cropanzano, 2010; Lee et al., 2012b; Senior et al., 2011), it may not always be the 
starting point triggering human behaviour. It may be, as argued by Zajonc (1984), subject 
to other, more primary, bodily functions under certain conditions. The question is, there-
fore, whether we can, with any degree of certainty, isolate the brain’s neurological activ-
ity as the sole and consistent producer of such aggregate phenomenal impressions (see 
Feldman Barrett et al., 2007). If we cannot, then the quality of inferences drawn from 
studies in the domain of organizational neuroscience must be questioned.
Conclusions
In our analysis, we have scrutinized and challenged the assumed possibilities and bene-
fits of reductionism in the neuroscientific study of leadership. Although, previously, 
reductionism had been formulated largely in hypothetical terms, advances in technolo-
gies and methods have turned the reductive ideal into a seductively real and tangible 
possibility. We have argued that, whereas the promising insights of neuroscientific 
approaches for the study of leadership have been embraced enthusiastically, fundamental 
concerns about the viability of such promises have been largely ignored.
For the purpose of our analysis, we have enlisted Sarkar’s (1992) threefold catego-
rization of reductionism and have outlined problems and concerns in each variant 
using leadership examples. We highlighted that all three types of reductionism popu-
late current debates on organizational neuroscience. First, understood as a reduction 
of theory, advocates of organizational neuroscience face the challenge of bridging 
heterogeneous idioms and logics and, if possible at all, thereby risk inflating (rather 
than reducing) complexity and ambiguity in their theoretical accounts. We then con-
sidered constitutive reductionism, which makes ontological claims about the constitu-
tive relationship between brain processes and human behaviour. We have shown that 
ontological claims are problematic because the properties and processes that make up 
one level of analysis do not strictly correspond to properties and processes operating 
at another level. In addition, we have expressed scepticism about the putative possi-
bility to access brain patterns directly and thereby circumvent otherwise distorting 
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influence of human consciousness by way of neuroscientific methods. Crucially, we 
find the ideal of a dehumanized scientific analysis fallacious, for it negates the influ-
ence of the researcher as a consciously interpreting human being in the research pro-
cess. It also neglects that human behaviour is essentially relational, rendering social 
phenomena, such as leader−follower interactions, irreducible to the thought processes 
of one individual alone. Finally, we have scrutinized explanatory reductionism, which 
suggests the possibility of identifying consistent patterns of explanation across vary-
ing hierarchical levels. Here, we identified two major critiques. First, we have sug-
gested the possibility of double-ended ‘multiple realizations’, where each 
micro-phenomenon may have multiple correspondents on a macro level, and vice 
versa. Second, we have introduced the ‘body−brain-pattern’, which suggests that the 
brain level is not always the ultimate cause of human behaviour, but merely one part 
of more complexly unfolding processes.
It is critically important to underline that, although all three types of reductionism 
have their distinguishing features, they all point out and underscore that the quality of 
inferences drawn from organizational neuroscientific research as they relate to measure-
ment and intervention is likely to suffer. As a result, where advocates of neuroscience 
currently claim the validity of their findings, we can, in fact, find considerably more 
ambiguity than is presently recognized. We, therefore, put the onus upon advocates of 
organizational neuroscience to demonstrate how the theoretical, ontological and explan-
atory challenges associated with reductionism can be resolved. Moreover, they have to 
show how these solutions can be translated methodologically in empirical designs to 
ensure that trustworthy conclusions can be drawn from these studies.
The prevailing ambiguities about the processes of organizational neuroscience may 
also caution us against the putative possibility of scientifically engineering organiza-
tionally desirable outcomes on the basis of ‘hard’ and ‘reliable’ units of analysis. On 
the contrary, we should be careful not to replace the many existing units of analysis. 
The scientific ideal of replacing the seemingly unreliable variable of the ‘human being’ 
with scientifically established facts that are immune to errors, changing opinions or 
lies to achieve a ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel, 1974), is both illusory and problematic. 
Neuroscientific research processes, like any other form of research activity, are subject 
to various translations and interpretations that connect laboratory results with the 
multi-level nature of organizational work (see Latour and Woolgar, 1979). These are 
accomplished by conscious and reflective human beings, and are thus prone to the 
influence of bias or short-sightedness, as well as political interests and personal aims 
of those involved (Rose and Rose, 2012; Zundel and Kokkalis, 2010). In a way, retain-
ing a sense of leaders as thinking and feeling individuals may compel us to consider 
explicitly the role of the consciously thinking researcher in the generation of scientific 
results, encouraging us more critically to reflect upon what our attempts at optimizing 
and normalizing behaviour may do to those who become subjected to neuroscientific 
re-engineering treatments. The ethical connotations of this development have been 
recognized in a recent exchange of diverging opinions (e.g. Ashkanasy, in press; 
Cropanzano and Becker, in press; Lindebaum, in press).
It is important to underline that the neuroscientific research paradigm is itself fluid 
and developing. We have noted that the ‘brain’ and ‘neurons’ are also concepts that may 
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be further reduced to the workings of atoms or chemicals, and that it is likely that future 
technical developments will again significantly shift research focus from neuro-images 
to biochemical compositions or other units of analysis. The current version of neurosci-
ence will, therefore, not be the final, all-solving approach to studying organizations. It 
merely indicates ongoing scientific progress coupled with technological advances. Thus, 
we suggest that there is a place for a variety of concepts and forms of inquiry at different 
levels of analysis, and that the divergence between them, rather than their unification, is 
indicative of a rich and thriving community of investigations.
Some important corollaries for organizational practice flow from the excitement 
surrounding neuroscience as a producer of hard and robust data. In particular, if the 
potency of neuroscience is linked with its ability to single out effective leaders (inspi-
rational leaders qualify for this category according to Waldman et al., 2011), then 
leadership scholars and practitioners are likely to be enticed by it (see Balthazard, 
2011). This may be particularly the case in times of economic crisis (Crotty, 2009). 
And yet, given the inference issues we identified, this would seem to cement the 
imperative to revisit traditional social science disciplines, such as sociology or psy-
chology, to continue examining socially complex phenomena (see Edwards, 2012), 
such as leadership. Somewhat ironically, the 10 to 25 per cent of variance explained in 
outcomes by traditional leadership predictors (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Bass and 
Bass, 2009) may not be such a second-class choice as advocates of organizational neu-
roscience (see Waldman et al., 2011) portray them to be. We urge, therefore, leadership 
scholars and practitioners not to be ‘blinded by neuroscience’ (Wastell and White, 
2012: 339) when the question arises whether or not it should be employed as a recruit-
ment or development tool. At present, it seems improbable to us that we can conclude 
with certainty that effective leaders can be identified and developed by way of neuro-
scientific methods. In addition to the inference issues we have outlined, another source 
of doubt in this regard lies in the contextual nuances that render a leader effective in 
one situation but not another (Lindebaum and Fielden, 2011). In this regard, Ghoshal 
(2005) reminds us of the potential damage that ‘bad’ management theories can have for 
organizational practice.
To conclude, we harbour no illusions that neuroscience will continue to significantly 
influence the research agenda in leadership and elsewhere. As Farah (2005) reminds us, 
it is not a question of whether or not, but how and when neuroscience will form and 
shape our future. However, given the many concerns and questions that remain, we sug-
gest that a first step in the right direction is to abandon the expectation that organizational 
neuroscience can single-handedly ‘revolutionize’ our understanding of leadership. 
Instead, we argue that it is potentially one form of inquiry amongst many valid and 
important ones.
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Notes
1. The authors are listed in alphabetical order. Both authors contributed equally to this article.
2. Importantly, neuroscientists themselves often recognize the limitations of reductionism when it 
comes to studying the complexity of the human brain. In fact, some neuroscientists are explicitly 
warning against a sole focus upon reductionist (i.e. analytical) approaches to their research at the 
expense of holistic (i.e. synthetic) insights. Precisely, it is argued that ‘the problem occurs when 
neuroscientists assume the superiority of one approach over the other’ (Cahill et al., 2001: 579). 
We argue that, in the process of transferring neuroscientific knowledge into their domain, leader-
ship scholars do not pay sufficient heed to this injunction when they follow the reductionist route.
3. If reductionist thinking is carried further, one could object here that the most basic building block 
of human behaviour does not reside in the cognitive machinery behind our thoughts, but at the level 
of atomic physics (see quote by Oppenheim and Putnam, 1958, detailed later). Ironically, therefore, 
what is described as a most basic building block of human behaviour by advocates of organizational 
neuroscience may actually not penetrate to the potentially deepest level of analysis possible.
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